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A LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND NORMATIVE
ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL PLANT CLOSING
LEGISLATION
INTRODUCTION
Plant closings and private disinvestment cost 38 million American
workers their jobs during the 1970's.' While plant closings are not new
to the American economy,2 their pace is accelerating.3 Northern states
have been especially affected, but sunbelt residents have also exper-
ienced unemployment due to plant closings.' Thus, plant closings dra-
matically affect the American labor market.
The National Employment Priorities Act,5 a bill sponsored by Con-
gressman William Ford (D-Mich.), attempts to mitigate the effects of
plant closings. In particular, the bill would require businesses to give
workers and their communities advance notice of plant closings and
severance payments.' It also provides federal assistance to displaced
workers and their communities.7 Sponsors of the bill hope to deter
plant closings, or at least to help the workers and their communities
adjust to the closings.8
This note focuses on aspects of the National Employment Priorities
Act, House bill 2847, pertaining to communities and local govern-
ments. It describes H.R. 2847, assesses the arguments for and against
the legislation, particularly the provisions related to communities and
local governments, and evaluates the alternatives to the proposal.
Advocates of H.R. 2847 believe appropriate federal legislation
could prevent many plant closings. They argue that legislation is
needed to internalize the social and economic costs of plant closings,
and to provide assistance to the workers and the communities adversely
affected by plant shutdowns. These advocates of H.R. 2847 believe the
only sound policy toward plant closings is to impose the social and
economic costs of closings on the corporations choosing to cease or
transfer their operations.9
1. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA 35 (1982) [herein-
after cited as BLUESTONE].
2. See G. SHULTZ & A. WEBER, STRATEGIES FOR THE DISPLACED WORKER (1966).
3. See R. GOODMAN, THE LAST ENTREPRENEURS (1979).
4. BLUESTONE, supra note 1, at 27-34.
5. H.R. 2847, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H2528 (daily ed. May 2, 1983).
6. Id. § 301.
7. Id. §§ 201-202, 206-209.
8. See, e.g., 129 CONG. REC. H2526-27 (daily ed. May 2, 1983) (statement of Rep. William
Ford, D-Mich.). See also Ford Plant Closing Legislation, DET. C.L. REV. 1219 (1983).
9. See, e.g., Plant Closings and Relocations." Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979) (statement of Sen. Harrison Williams, D-
N.J.). Senator Williams stated:
Economists recognize that there are many costs which are not adequately accounted
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Opponents of the legislation argue that capital mobility, as exer-
cised in such closings, provides a net benefit for American society. Op-
ponents of H.R. 2847 see plant closings as a necessary feature of
economic efficiency. They argue that the pursuit of economic efficiency
increases the total value of goods and services available to the Ameri-
can consumer, and greatly outweighs any negative effects of plant clos-
ings.'O Furthermore, these opponents regard plant closing legislation as
an infringement on economic freedom."t
THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO PLANT CLOSINGS
Proponents of plant closing legislation are quick to point out that
the United States lags far behind other industrialized countries in af-
fording workers and communities protection from plant closings.
1 2
The United States is one of the few industrialized nations without a
national plant closing law. Great Britain, West Germany, Belgium,
France, Italy, Australia and Sweden all regulate plant closings.'
3
The content of these plant closing laws varies from country to coun-
try. Commonly, such laws require advance notice to employees and
the government, severance payments, pension protection, and acknowl-
for by the cold calculus of the marketplace. The cost of pollution is an obvious exam-
ple. We can all agree that pollution is a social cost for which the polluter must take
some responsibility. It is now time to recognize the decision to move a plant, even
though economically sound, imposes costs on employees for which management must
also be in some part responsible.
See also Sclar, Social Cost Minimization.- A National Policy Approach to the Problems of
Distressed Economic Regions, 10 POL. STUD. J. 235, at 235 (1981); January 1980 Hearings,
infra note 12, at 130 (statement of Ralph Whipple, Region 6 Director, U.A.W.). Mr. Whip-
ple stated:
I would like to emphasize the importance of the principles underlying the legislation.
The impact of private investment decisions is a matter of national public concern.
These decisions must factor in economic and social costs to workers and their commu-
nities. The workers should not bear the brunt of economic decisions that benefit in-
vestors and the whole country, and that labor should not be as mobile as capital.
10. See infra, text accompanying notes 140-154.
11. See McKenzie, The Case For Plant Closings, POL'Y REV. 119, 126 (1981). See also infra, text
accompanying note 207.
12. See The National Employment Priorities Act. Hearings on HR 13541 Before the General Sub-
comm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 74-80
(1974) (excerpts from U.A.W. Legal Dept. Memorandum, entitled Worker's Rights and Plant
Shutdown (1972) [hereinafter cited as October 1974 Hearings]; The National Employment Pri-
orities Act. Hearings on HR 76 Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 118-26 (1975) (report of the Library of
Congress, entitled Plant Closure and Relocation Laws in Western Europe (1975)) [hereinafter
cited as May 1975 Hearings]; National Employment Priorities Act.' Hearings on HR. 76 Before
the Subcomm on Labor Standards of the House CommL on Education and Labor, 95th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 48, 54-60 (1978) (statement of Marc Stepp, Vice-President, U.A.W.) [hereinafter
cited as August 1978 Hearings]; National Employment Priorities Act.' Joint Hearings on HR
5040 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities and the SubcomnL on Labor-Man-
agement Relations of the House Comm on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 78-126
(1980) (Joint Report of the Labor Union Study Tour Participants, entitled Economic Disloca-
tion (1979)) [hereinafter cited as January 1980 Hearings]; Hekman & Strong, Is There a Case
for Plant Closing Laws?, NEw ENG. ECON. REV., July/Aug., 1980, 34, at 47-51; Note, Plant
Closings and the Duty to Consult Under Britain's Employment Protection Act of 1975. Lessons
for the United States, 5 B.C. INT'L AND COMp. L. REV. 195 (1982).
13. See authorities cited, supra note 12.
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edgment of employee rights to be transferred with the relocating
plant.' 4 In most Western European countries, a corporation cannot
relocate a factory without prior governmental approval.15 In West
Germany, for instance, a company cannot relocate a plant unless it is
deemed to be "socially justified." ' 6 Furthermore, most of these govern-
ments will withhold such approval if the corporation's sole reason for
moving is to reduce production costs.' 7
These laws go much further than H.R. 2847 in regulating the corpo-
rate decision to close a plant.'" On the other hand, most of these gov-
ernments have also traditionally involved themselves in regulating
their economy and providing social welfare to a much greater extent
than has the United States Government. 19
ALTERNATIVES TO FEDERAL PLANT CLOSING LEGISLATION
Federal regulation of plant closings represents one approach to mit-
igating the effects of such closings. Other approaches have been sug-
gested as well. Before the efficacy of H.R. 2847 can be judged, these
options should be evaluated. Prominent among these options are col-
lective bargaining laws and state plant closing legislation.
Protection of Workers Through Collective Bargaining
House bill 2847 is predicated on the finding that "plant closings
• . . can be averted through the cooperative efforts of government, la-
bor, and business."2 Collective bargaining between the workers and
management is one vehicle for such efforts. If collective bargaining is
successful in preventing a plant closing, the entire community benefits
from the saving of jobs for the local economy. Consequently, collective
bargaining over plant closing decisions is one alternative to federal
plant closing legislation.
14. See, e.g., January 1980 Hearings, supra note 12, at 116-123 for a translation and presentation
of West German plant closing laws.
15. See October 1974 Hearings, supra note 12, at 80 (excerpts from U.A.W. Legal Dept. Memo-
randum, entitled Workers Rights and Plant Shutdown (1972). The memorandum reported:
In most of the Western European nations, a company may not relocate without
the permission of the government. The standards used by the agency in reviewing the
decision include "the effect on overall unemployment," "in the public interest," and
"socially justified."
Several nations go even further and require that the company must secure govern-
ment permission for any decision which would result in unemployment-even a tem-
porary layoff.
1d. at 80. For a fuller description of these provisions see id. at 74-80.
16. October 1974 Hearings, supra note 12, at 74-75.
17. Id. at 74.
18. House bill 2847 would impose severance pay and prenotification requirements upon compa-
nies seeking to close a plant, but it would not bar a plant closure or relocation. While under
H.R. 2847, the Secretary of Labor would investigate the closing, the purpose of the investiga-
tion would be to find ways, through cooperation, to avert the closing or mitigate the effects of
the closing. For a fuller description of H.R. 2847, see text accompanying notes 80-109.
19. See P. KAIM-CAUDLE, COMPARATIVE SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL SECURITY, 1973; SOCIAL
SECURITY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (S. Jenkins ed. 1969).
20. H.R. 2847, supra note 5, § 102(a)(2).
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One third of collective bargaining agreements provide for restric-
tions on the closing or relocating of plants.2 These provisions, how-
ever, are generally only included in the agreements with larger
bargaining units.22 Consequently, collective bargaining contracts do
not protect even organized workers in many cases.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)2 3 provides that employ-
ers have a duty to bargain which extends to all "terms and conditions
of employment."24 In Fibreboard v. NLRB,25 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that an employer must negotiate with the employees' union over a
decision to subcontract work previously performed by the employees.
The Court stated that "[t]he subject matter of the present dispute is well
within the literal meaning of the phrase 'terms and conditions of
employment.' "26
The National Labor Relations Board (the Board) found Fibreboard
dispositive in Ozark Trailers, Inc.27 In Ozark Trailers, the employer
had closed one of its plants for economic reasons.2" The Board found
that the company's failure to negotiate with the union prior to the clo-
sure constituted a violation of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.2 9 The
Board rejected the employer's argument that economic investment de-
cisions were within the sole prerogative of management:
For, just as the employer has invested capital in the business so the
employee has invested years of his working life, accumulating senior-
ity, accruing pension rights, and developing skills that may or may not
be salable to another employer. And, just as the employer's interest in
the protection of his capital investment is entitled to consideration in
our interpretation of the Act, so is the employee's interest in the protec-
tion of his livelihood.3°
In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,3 the U.S. Supreme
Court limited the applicability of the Ozark Trailer decision. The em-
ployer in First National Maintenance Corp. had ceased its custodial
service contract with a nursing home and terminated the employees
assigned under that contract without consulting the employees' union.
In ruling for the employer, the Court admitted the phrase "terms and
21. Note, Easing the Hardship ofPlant Shutdowns, MONTHLY LAB. REV. (March 1982) at 43.
22. Mick, Social and Personal Costs of Plant Shudowns, 14 INDUs. REL. 203, 207 (1975).
23. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), amended by Labor Management Relations
Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. V 1982).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). For discussion of employers' duty to bargain with employees see
Morales, The Obligation ofa Multiplant Employer to Bargain on the Decision to Close One of
Its Plants, 30 LAB. L.J. 709 (1979); Note, Partial Closings. The Scope of an Employer's Duty
to Bargain, 61 B.U.L. REV. 735 (1981); Comment, Collective Bargaining Over Plant Reloca-
tion Decisions: Let's Make a Deal, 18 NEw ENG. L. REV. 715 (1983).
25. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
26. Id. at 210.
27. 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966).
28. The employer cited excessive worker hours for production, defective workmanship, and inef-
ficient plant facilities as reasons for the closing. Id. at 567-68.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976).
30. 161 N.L.R.B. at 566.
31. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
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conditions of employment" could be subject to various interpretations.
Nonetheless, it stated that "Congress had no expectation that the
elected union representative would become an equal partner in the run-
ning of the business enterprise in which the union's members are em-
ployed."32 In First National Maintenance Corp., however, the Court
itself sought to limit the applicability of its holding. The Court noted
that the employer "had no intention to replace the discharged employ-
ees or to move that operation elsewhere."33 The Court argued that in
this particular case, the situation was one not amenable to the collective
bargaining process since the terms of a contract with a third party over
which the "union had no control or authority"34 were disputed. These
differences, the Court argued, adequately distinguished the case from
the Court's earlier decision in Fibreboard.35
By reaffirming its holding in Fibreboard, while holding for the em-
ployer in First National Maintenance Corp., the Court left the extent of
an employer's duty to bargain with employees facing a plant closing or
plant relocation unresolved.36 In its subsequent decisions, the NLRB
initially held that a management decision to relocate a plant was sub-
ject to collective bargaining.37 More recently, however, the NLRB,
with new members appointed by the Reagan Administration, reconsid-
ered its earlier decision in Milwaukee Springs I38 and reversed itself. In
Milwaukee Springs I,39 the NLRB held that while the NLRA requires
the employers to bargain with the union over its decision to relocate,
this does not require the employer to "obtain a union's consent on a
matter not contained in the body of a collective bargaining
agreement."'
In light of the First National Maintenance Corp. and Milwaukee
Springs II decisions, the efficacy of relying on collective bargaining
laws to deter plant closings is questionable."a While plant closings or
relocations motivated by anti-union animus violate the NLRA,4 2 these
recent decisions indicate that relocating plants merely to find lower la-
bor costs does not necessarily constitute anti-union animus. Hence,
32. Id. at 676.
33. Id. at 687.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 688.
36. For a discussion of the effect of First Nat. Maintenance Corp., see Comment, supra note 24, at
740-46.
37. See, e.g., Tocco Div. of Park-Ohio Industries, 257 N.L.R.B. 413 (1981); Milwaukee Springs,
265 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,317 (1982).
38. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,317 (1982).
39. Milwaukee Springs, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87 (filed Jan. 27, 1984).
40. Id., slip op. at 7. See also Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. No. 162 (filed Apr. 6, 1984).
41. Furthermore, in NLRB v. Bildisco, 52 U.S.L.W. 4270 (Feb. 22, 1984), the Court held that
employers filing for bankruptcy can reject their collective bargaining agreements if "the
debtor can show the collective-bargaining agreement burdens the estate, and that after care-
ful scrutiny, the equities balance in favor of rejecting the labor contract." Id. at 4274.
42. See Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., 380 U.S. 263
(1965).
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workers and their communities should consider legislative solutions to
the problem of plant closings.
State Plant Closing Legislation
State plant closing legislation presents an alternative to federal leg-
islation. Only a few states have enacted plant closing laws,43 although
several state legislatures have considered such legislation.4
Compared to H.R. 2847, those states that have enacted plant closing
legislation impose rather mild restrictions on business relocations.
South Carolina, for example, requires that employers give employees
two weeks notice before a shutdown,4 but this requirement applies
only to employers who require that employees give them notice prior to
quitting.46 Wisconsin requires that employers planning a shutdown or
relocation give employees sixty days notice,47 but this requirement is
only imposed on employers of 100 persons or more.48 In addition to
requiring that firms give sixty days notice to both their employees and
the municipality of the plant's locale, Maine law requires payment of
one week's severance pay to employees.49 With the exception of
Maine, no state requires companies to give advance notification to mu-
nicipalities or otherwise directly afford the community protection.
Several other states have considered plant closing legislation."
Nevertheless, several factors deter states from enacting legislation that
provides protection for workers and communities comparable to that of
H.R. 2847. The first serious impediment to state legislation is economic
in nature. States, fearful of losing industry to other states or discourag-
ing companies from establishing new plants in their state, are reluctant
to impose stricter requirements on companies than the states competing
with them for industry impose.51 Because of this competition, plant
closing legislation must be national in scope.5 2
Second, in addition to the economic deterrent, states face additional
43. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 625, 625-B (West Supp. 1983-1984); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 109.07 (West Supp. 1983-1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-40 (Law. Co-op. 1977); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.60-445.606 (West 1967).
44. Ohio, Delaware, Oregon, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, California, Pennsylvania, Mon-
tana, New Hampshire and Indiana have all had plant closing laws formally proposed in their
legislatures. For a discussion of the efforts to enact state plant closing legislation, see
GoRDIES, JARLEY & FERMAN, PLANT CLOSINGS AND ECONOMIC DISLOCATION, 58-64 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as GORDIES]; Arnold, Existing and Proposed Regulation ofBusiness Disloca-
tion, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 209, 229-37 (1980).
45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-40 (Law. Co-op 1977).
46. Id.
47. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 109.07 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
48. Id.
49. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B (West Supp. 1983-1984).
50. See Arnold, supra note 44. See also GORDIES, supra note 44.
51. See, e.g., Note, supra note 12, at 197. This problem facing states is not isolated to plant
closing legislation, but arises any time a state considers enacting stricter health, safety, or
labor regulations or increasing taxes.
52. Id See also a resolution of the Connecticut State Senate, S. Res. 57, (adopted April 18,
1978), reprinted in August 1978 Hearings, supra note 12, at 76.
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constitutional hurdles not facing the Federal Government in regulating
plant closings.53 For instance, state plant closing legislation has been
challenged54 as a violation of the Contract Clause. The Contract
Clause of the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall
• . . pass any . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."55 In
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,s6 the U.S. Supreme Court in-
voked the Contract Clause to strike down a Minnesota statute57 which
imposed a "pension funding charge" on those employers providing
pension benefits18 to employees and subsequently terminating the pen-
sion plan or closing the establishment. The Court held this charge to
be violative of the Contract Clause in that "[t]he company thus had no
reason to anticipate that its employees' pension rights could become
vested except in accordance with the terms of the plan."59
It is unclear whether the Spannaus decision would apply to state
plant closing legislation if the legislation imposed a severance payment
requirement. In Spannaus, the statute interfered with the pension con-
tract between the company and its employees, while a severance pay-
ment requirement does not interfere with any such contract, especially
since employers often consider employees "terminable at will." Fur-
thermore, the Court in Spannaus differentiated 60 the pension statute
from an earlier Minnesota statute upheld in Home Building & Loan As-
sociation v. Blaisdell.6 In Blaisdell, the Court upheld a state law which
extended the date of the foreclosure sale beyond that in the mortgage
contract. In Spannaus, the Court argued that the pension statute did
not affect "every Minnesota employer. . . but at only those who had in
the past been sufficiently enlightened as voluntarily to agree to estab-
lish pension plans for their employees, '62 while the statute upheld in
Blaisdell was "enacted to deal with a broad, generalized economic or
social problem. ' 63 Most proposed state plant closing legislation more
nearly resembles the statute upheld in Blaisdell, because it would apply
to all employers, above a given size, within the state. In short, the Con-
tract Clause does not engender a serious constitutional challenge to
state plant closing legislation.
A more serious legal challenge' to plant closing legislation at the
53. For a detailed analysis of the legal impediments to state plant closing legislation, see Arnold,
supra note 44.
54. Id. at 242-45.
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
56. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
57. MINN. STAT. § 181B.01 (1974).
58. The statute applied to benefits provided under section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code,
I.R.C. § 401 (1976).
59. 438 U.S. at 245-46.
60. Id. at 248-50.
61. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
62. 438 U.S. at 250.
63. Id.
64. See Arnold, supra note 44, at 251-53.
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state level arises from the Commerce Clause.6 5 The Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that Con-
gress shall "regulate Commerce. . . among the several States ... ."66
Thus, the Commerce Clause limits the power of the individual states to
interfere with "interstate commerce."67 Not every state law affecting
interstate commerce violates the Constitution; state laws "incidentally
or indirectly" burdening interstate commerce are permissible. 68 Never-
theless, the Court closely scrutinizes any state attempts to impede free
movement of trade.69 The Supreme Court has long held that a state
cannot enact legislation to keep articles of trade out of interstate com-
merce simply to use them within the state.7° "Protectionist measures"
by states attempting to insulate themselves from the adverse impacts of
free trade between the states constitutes a "per se" violation of the
Commerce Clause.7" Whether a statute is "protectionist" will be deter-
mined in view of what legitimate local interests are advanced by the
legislation.72 A state cannot place an embargo on goods simply on the
basis of the need for the goods within the state,73 especially when a less
burdensome restraint on trade would protect the legitimate local inter-
ests.74 On the other hand, state regulations which are intended to pro-
tect the welfare of the state residents regarding the production of goods
may be permissible,75 especially when most of the products are to be
consumed within the state.76
One objective of plant closing legislation-to deter plants from
moving away from their present location-would constitute a "protec-
tionist measure," inhibiting the free flow of trade between the states.
Furthermore, at least with the severance payment provisions, remedies
less restrictive of interstate commerce are available because the state
could make severance payments out of the state's general revenue.77
State legislation does not appear to be an effective remedy for plant
closings. Economic and legal problems deter enactment of strong and
comprehensive state plant closing legislation. If a legislative response
to plant closings is appropriate, it requires action by the United States
Congress.
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
66. Id.
67. For an authoritative treatment of the Commerce Clause, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 266-91 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK].
68. Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346, 351 (1939).
69. NOWAK, supra note 67, at 284-89.
70. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322 (1979).
71. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
72. Id.
73. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
74. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
75. Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346 (1939).
76. Id.
77. For a discussion of this point, see Arnold, supra note 44, at 251-52.
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HOUSE BILL 2847:
THE NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT PRIORITIES ACT
Congressman William Ford (D-Mich.) is the chief sponsor of the
National Employment Priorities Act (H.R. 2847) in the House of Rep-
resentatives.78 The Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations of
the House Committee on Labor and Education approved H.R. 2847
without amendments in the first session of the 98th Congress. 79 The
stated purpose of the bill is "to facilitate economic adjustment of com-
munities, businesses, and workers; to require business concerns to give
advance notice of plant closings and permanent layoffs; to provide
assistance, including retraining to dislocated workers, and for other
purposes."80
House bill 2847 has four parts, all of which apply to businesses with
fifty or more employees. 8 First, H.R. 2847 makes federal assistance
available in various forms to workers,82 communities, 83 and busi-
nesses. 4 Second, the bill imposes various duties upon businesses, in-
cluding prenotification to workers, communities, and the Secretary of
Labor,85 and severance pay to workers86 and their communities.87
Third, the bill creates criminal88 and civil penalties89 for certain viola-
tions of the Act. Finally, the bill would establish a National Employ-
ment Priorities Administration to conduct research 90 and a National
Employment Priorities Advisory Council to advise the Secretary of
Labor.91
Under section 201 of the bill, the Secretary of Labor may provide
assistance to workers whose jobs were terminated by a plant closing.
Assistance may include job training, job placement services, and small
payments related to worker expenses incurred in the search for new
employment.92 The Secretary of Labor would be authorized to estab-
78. See H.R. 2847, supra note 5. Various versions of this bill have been before Congress since
first being introduced in 1973 by Sen. Walter Mondale, D-Minn. See S. 2809, 93rd Cong.,
ist Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 41,364 (1973); H.R. 13,541, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC.
7013 (1974); H.R. 76, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 146 (1975); H.R. 13,100, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 9866 (1976); H.R. 76, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC.
128 (1977); S. 1966, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 25,743 (1977); H.R. 5040, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 21,679 (1979); S. 1608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG.
REc. 21,488 (1979); S. 1609, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 21,496 (1979); H.R. 565,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H66 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981).
79. Approved on Oct. 6, 1983, CONG. INDEX (CCH), 34,508 (Oct. 6, 1983).
80. H.R. 2847, supra note 5 (Preface).
81. Id. § 103(12).
82. Id. §§ 201, 202, 208, 209.
83. Id. §§ 206-207.
84. Id. §§ 203-205.
85. Id. § 301.
86. Id. § 402.
87. Id. § 407.
88. Id. § 501(a) calls for fines of not more than $1,000 and imprisonment for not more than one
year.
89. Id. § 502.
90. 1d. § 510.
91. Id. § 511.
92. Id. § 201.
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lish retraining programs for these workers. 93 The bill imposes upon
businesses which close plants a duty to give their employees severance
pay equal to eighty-five per cent of the employees average wage for
fifty-two weeks, but not exceeding $25,000 per employee. 94 No busi-
ness is required to make payments to any employee who refuses com-
parable employment with the same company at another location
"within reasonable commuting distance." '95 A business closing an op-
eration must offer its employees a position at other establishments op-
erated by the business with wages and benefits comparable to that of
the prior position96 and must pay the employees "reasonable expenses
incurred . . . in connection with moving" in order to begin the new
position. 97
Particularly germane to any discussion of plant closing legislation is
the assistance H.R. 2847 makes available to local governments which,
as a result of a plant closing, "suffer. .. a substantial decrease in in-
come, . . . a substantial increase in demand for . . . social services,
or a substantial increase in the number of unemployed individuals
who reside within the jurisdiction of . . . [the] local govermnent. 98
Available assistance includes "grants, loans, and loan guarantees" to
fulfill the increased demand for social services or to create public works
projects.99 Approval of such assistance is at the discretion of the Secre-
tary of Labor."
House bill 2847 also imposes liability on businesses for the loss of
local government revenue.' 0 ' The amount of the liability would equal
eighty-five per cent of one year's revenue loss based on the average tax
liability of the business establishment for the three prior fiscal years. 0 2
Also, if a business transfers an operation outside the United States and
the Secretary of Labor finds that "an economically viable alternative to
such a transfer existed" within the country, the business would be liable
to the Federal Government for three hundred percent of one year's
revenue loss based on the average tax liability of the operation for the
three prior taxable years. 0 3
Another important feature of H.R. 2847 is the prenotification re-
quirement." ° The bill requires that when a business "determines, or
reasonably should have determined," that a "change of operations"
will result in a loss of employment of either 100 employees or fifteen
93. Id. §§ 201(c)(1), 202.
94. Id. § 402(a)(6).
95. Id. § 402(a)(8).
96. Id. § 404.
97. Id. § 402(b).
98. Id. § 206.
99. Id. § 207(a).
100. Id.
101. Id. § 407.
102. Id.
103. Id. § 407(c).
104. Id. § 301.
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per cent of the plant's workforce, whichever is less, the business must
provide notification of the closings to the Secretary of Labor, the em-
ployees, the employees' respective unions, and certain local govern-
ments." 5 If 100 employees or fewer will be laid off, prenotification
must be made six months in advance; but if more than 100 employees
will be terminated, at least one year notice must be given. 106 Here, the
bill provides an exception for "circumstances" the Secretary of Labor
finds "beyond the control of the business."10 7
House bill 2847 includes a legislative finding that "plant closings
• ..can be averted through cooperative efforts" which are "greatly as-
sisted through" prenotification. 0 8 Accordingly, the bill requires the
Secretary of Labor to conduct an investigation and hold public hear-
ings, to determine the reason for the closing, the effects of the closing,
and possible steps to prevent the closing or mitigate its effects. 0 9
LEGAL ISSUES
Although federal plant closing legislation would not be subject to
some of the constitutional problems state legislation faces," 0 such as
the Contract Clause"1  and the Commerce Clause, 1 2 questions have
been raised about other aspects of its constitutionality. "3 These issues
include equal protection 1 4 and the "taking" of private property by the
Federal Government." 5
Equal Protection and Classification
Professor Thomas Arnold has suggested that H.R. 2847 could be
attacked as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution because it classifies businesses by the
number of people employed." t6 If enacted, the bill would apply to all
business establishments employing fifty or more persons.' " This clas-
sification, however, would probably be upheld because courts generally
uphold legislative classifications created for economic regulation." 8
More specifically, courts generally uphold the classification of busi-
105. Id. § 301(a), (b).
106. Id. § 301(b)(3)(A).
107. Id. § 301(b)(3)(B).
108. Id. § 102(a)(2).
109. Id. § 302.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 53-77.
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 54-63.
112. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 64-77.
113. See Arnold, supra note 44, at 245-5 1.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I and, by implication through the Due Process Clause, U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
115. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
116. See Arnold, supra note 44, at 245-47.
117. H.R. 2847, supra note 5, § 103(12).
118. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 472 U.S. 297 (1976); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See also NOWAK, supra note 67, at
586-99. Legislative classifications in economic regulations need only be "rationally related to
a legitimate state interest." City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303.
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nesses based on the number of persons employed."19
Accordingly, a challenge to the Maine plant closing law'20 on
grounds of an equal protection violation was rejected. In Shapiro Bros.
Shoe Co. v. Lewiston-Auburn Shoeworkers Protective Association,t2t the
court upheld the distinction in the Maine plant closing law between
businesses with 100 or more employees and those with fewer than 100
employees. The law's provisions only applied to the former. The
Maine Supreme Court found the legislature's choice of 100 not to be
arbitrary since "were this to be deemed unconstitutional, no effective
regulation by statute could ever be possible in a practical sense."
1 22
Furthermore, the court found this classification to be consistent with
the purpose of the law:
The problems at which the statute is directed will be solved more easily
and effectively by zeroing in on those large employers who may volun-
tarily close a business. The closing of a sizable business will create
greater unemployment and other social headaches than will the shut-
ting down of smaller places of business whose effect may be
negligible. 123
In short, H.R. 2847 probably does not violate equal protection re-
quirements. The application of the legislation's provisions to busi-
nesses with fifty or more employees is rationally related to the
legitimate purpose of the legislation and, in any event, the courts
demonstrate great deference to such legislative classification.' 24
"Taking" Without Compensation
Professor Arnold has also questioned 25 whether the prenotification
requirement of H.R. 2847 poses a threat to its constitutionality because
the fifth amendment prohibits a government taking without just com-
pensation.' 26 Although the government may enact reasonable regula-
tions in the exercise of its police powers, 27 regulation that goes too far
will be considered a "taking."1 28
Arnold argues that requiring a business to give notice prior to clos-
ing might be a "taking" of the company's property because it would
119. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937) where the Supreme
Court upheld an unemployment insurance statute applying only to employers with more
than eight employees.
120. Act of Sept. 23, 1971, ch. 452, 1971 Me. Laws 917 (codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, §§ 625, 625-B (West Supp. 1983-1984)).
121. 320 A.2d 247 (Me. 1974).
122. Id. at 257.
123. Id. at 256.
124. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
125. See Arnold, supra note 44, at 247-51.
126. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides, in part, that "[njo person shall...be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation."
127. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
128. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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have to continue operating for the term provided in the prenotification
provision even if it were losing money on the operation.'29 The
Supreme Court held, in Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission,131
that requiring a business to continue a losing operation against its will
constitutes a "taking." This principle coincides with Court holdings
that regulated industries must be permitted a "reasonable" rate of
return.1
3
'
The government, however, still retains much leeway in combatting
plant closings. The Court has long held that property rights are not
absolute and that government may restrict such rights when regulating
for the public good, even if this hinders the profitability of an enter-
prise. 132 Moreover, the Court recently has restricted its holding in
Brooks-Scanlon. In New Haven Inclusion Cases, 3 3 the Court upheld a
railroad reorganization order which required certain railroad opera-
tions to continue at a loss for the period of the bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion. The Court rejected the bondholders' argument that the
diminution in value of their assets was a compensable taking, since, the
Court reasoned, this was a risk they assumed when they invested in the
railroad.
Professor Arnold, citing the Brooks-Scanlon decision, 134 argues that
any prenotification requirement except those involving a very short pe-
riod of time, would constitute a "taking."' 35  Not only has Brooks-
Scanlon been limited by the New Haven Inclusion Cases, but also the
prenotification requirement of H.R. 2847 is distinguishable from the
facts in Brooks-Scanlon. In Brooks-Scanlon, the Court struck down an
order which prohibited the railroad operations from terminating. If the
operation continued to lose money the assets would have eventually
disappeared entirely. House bill 2847 merely requires six months to
one year prenotification, t36 at the end of which time the assets may be
recovered. Rather than "taking" a corporation's property, the preno-
tification requirement of H.R. 2847 seeks to prevent harm to workers
and the community caused by sudden plant closings.
129. See Arnold, supra note 44, at 247-51.
130. 251 U.S. 396 (1920). The Court struck down the order of a state commission prohibiting a
corporation from ceasing its railroad operations even though it was losing money on them.
The Court held that a company could not be compelled to continue at a loss. Four years
later the Court reaffirmed the holding of Brooks-Scanlon in Railroad Comm'n of Texas v.
Eastern Texas R.R. Co., 264 U.S. 79 (1924).
131. See, e.g., Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Va., 262
U.S. 679 (1923); Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs v. New York Tele. Co., 271 U.S. 23 (1926).
132. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), in which the court upheld the regulation
of milk prices. See also Day-Brite Lighting Co. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) in which the
Court upheld a Missouri statute requiring employers to permit employees to take up to four
hours offwork to vote with pay. The Court held that forcing the employer to pay wages for a
period in which no services were performed was not unconstitutional since "many forms of
regulation reduce the net return of the enterprise." Id. at 424.
133. 399 U.S. 392 (1970).
134. Arnold, supra note 44, at 248.
135. Id. at 247-51.
136. H.R. 2847, supra note 5, § 301.
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Shapiro Bros. Shoe Co. v. Lewiston-Auburn Shoeworkers Protective
Association 137 supports this analysis. In Shapiro Bros. the Maine
Supreme Court upheld Maine's plant closing law. The plaintiff alleged
that the one month prenotification requirement constituted a "taking"
of its property. The court held the provision to be "a reasonable exer-
cise of the police power" 38 and found the regulation to be a reasonable
attempt to counter "a sure and primary contributing cause of social and
economic unrest."'' 39 Therefore, the fifth amendment should not be a
serious impediment to H.R. 2847.
CRITICISM OF HOUSE BILL 2847
Critics of H.R. 2847 question the need for government action to
combat plant closings. " Opponents of plant closing legislation believe
the free market economy will solve the problem through its own mech-
anisms.' 4 ' Indeed, some opponents of plant closing legislation believe
plant closings are essential to a properly functioning economy.1 42 They
view efforts to prevent such closings as only worsening the plant closing
situation by impeding the natural mechanisms of the free market.
Richard McKenzie, a Clemson University economist, has been the
most outspoken critic of plant closing legislation. McKenzie argues
that plant closing legislation, including H.R. 2847, creates inefficiency
in the economy by restricting capital mobility. 41 McKenzie argues a
national plant closing law would:
slow the growth of national income, reduce the rise in real wage rates,
contribute to inflation, increase unemployment, and reduce the social
mobility of workers-while at the same time reducing business profits
and the efficiency of the U.S. economy.'44
According to Professor McKenzie, economic efficiency requires that
each region develop its "comparative advantage."' 145 Restricting the
flow of resources, including capital, prevents resources from being
more efficiently used elsewhere. " This restriction results in higher
production costs and lower national income. " Allowing the free flow
of capital, on the other hand, permits a more efficient use of resources
which, in turn, benefits even those regions losing industry, since they
will be able to obtain goods and services at a lower price.
14 8
Professor McKenzie admits that much of the industrial exodus to
137. 320 A.2d 247 (Me. 1974).
138. Id. at 255.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., R. MCKENZIE, RESTRICTIONS ON BUSINESS MOBILITY (1979).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 5.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 56.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 22. 26.
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the sunbelt is motivated by the lower wages employers pay workers, 149
but he argues that this migration is "to be expected in free markets that
allocate resources from less productive to more productive uses."
151
McKenzie expects the eventual convergence of wages between the re-
gions and a slowdown of plant movement.15" Restricting capital mobil-
ity, McKenzie argues, creates an "excise tax" on the use of labor,
producing greater unemployment.' 52 Some critics of H.R. 2847 believe
that workers and communities should accede to business demands for
concessions; they oppose H.R. 2847 because it would inhibit the grant-
ing of necessary "adjustments."' 53 McKenzie also argues that requir-
ing companies to make severance payments would threaten their
solvency. 5
4
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF HOUSE BILL 2847
Critics of H.R. 2847 argue that the legislation, if enacted, would
cause economic "inefficiency."' 55 The paradigm that these critics are
using in drawing this conclusion is neoclassical economic analysis.' 56
While the neoclassical economic model has been heavily criticized by
both economists 57 and ethicists, 58 in order to respond to critics of na-
tional plant closing legislation, the effects of such a law will be ana-
lyzed by the use of their own model.
The Neoclassical Paradigm
In neoclassical economic analysis the primary measure of economic
welfare is "efficiency."'159 When economists assess whether or not a
policy is "efficient" they ask whether it is "Pareto optimal."' 60 A policy
149. Id. at 5, 42-45.
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id.
152. McKenzie, supra note 11, at 131.
153. See May 1975 Hearings, supra note 12 (statement of Mario DiFederico, Executive Vice-Pres-
ident of Firestone). See also MCKENZIE, supra note 140, at 60, where he asserts that "the
enactment of relocation rules is likely to lead to higher taxes and lower quality services in
many jurisdictions." McKenzie cites James Madison for the principle that market competi-
tion should exist between government units.
154. McKenzie, supra note 11, at 123.
155. See, e.g., MCKENZIE, supra note 140.
156. Eg., McKenzie argues that "rising income is to be expected in free markets that allocate
resources from less productive to more productive uses," id. at 5. See also id. at 53, where
McKenzie states:
Competition, to the extent that it exists in the marketplace, induces people to produce
at their limits, given their preferences and cost constraints. In this sense competition
maximizes national output and income. Government policies that restrict trade or the
ability of markets to adjust to changes in preferences, prices, and profits restrict not
only individual choices but also national produce and income.
157. See, e.g., J. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1958); M. Ltrrz & K. Lux, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF HUMANISTIC ECONOMICS (1979); C. WILBER & K. JAMESON, AN INQUIRY INTO
THE POVERTY OF ECONOMICS (1983).
158. See infra text accompanying notes 211-214.
159. The field of economics devoted to the study of society's economic welfare is called "welfare
economics."
160. The "Pareto criteria" used by economists is named after Vilfredo Pareto, an early twentieth
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is considered economically efficient if no person could be made better
off without making any other person worse off. 6 ' The point of Pareto
optimality has been reached when three conditions have been met:
(1) resources are allocated so that no more of one good can be pro-
duced without producing less of another good, or in other words, the
best available technology must be used; (2) no possible advantageous
grounds for trade exist between consumers; and (3) the rate at which
producers supply various goods is equivalent to the rate at which con-
sumers demand various goods. Practically speaking, if the Pareto crite-
ria were strictly applied, the point of efficiency would never be reached
since almost any important economic policy or transaction produces
both winners and losers. Consequently, economists have modified the
test of efficiency so that an efficient policy is one in which the gains to
the winners are enough to offset the losses of the losers. 6 2 Under the
neoclassical economic model, the point of Pareto efficiency will be
reached in a fully competitive free market economy, providing no mar-
ket failures, including externalities, exist. 163
The Pareto criteria themselves do not determine how economic
goods should be distributed; distribution is an ethical question left to be
decided on some other basis. Essentially, policymaking based on the
Pareto criteria would only call for marginal changes in the status quo
of present wealth distribution, although some economists have posited
that reaching the point of economic efficiency requires more extensive
income redistribution." 6 In short, "economic efficiency" as measured
century Italian economist. See V. PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1909) (A.
Schwier trans. 1971).
161. For a more detailed and technical explanation of economic efficiency, see A. BRAFF,
MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 259-72 (1969); Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare Max-
imization, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (1957); R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 62-68 (3d ed. 1980); R. TRESCH, PUBLIC FINANCE: A NORMA-
TIVE THEORY 20-35 (1981); E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
356-69 (abr. 3d ed. 1979); J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 286-93
(3d ed. 1980). Neoclassical economic analysis measures utility ordinally rather than cardi-
nally; in other words, it assumes that the one dollar an affluent member of society needs to
purchase an imported beer is equivalent in social welfare terms to the one dollar a poor
person needs to purchase food or medicine. See MANSFIELD, at 54-56. This assumption is
quite controversial. See, e.g., Lurz & Lux, supra note 157.
162. This modification is known as the compensation principle. See Hicks, The Foundations of
Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696-712 (1939); Kaldor, Welfare Propositions in Economics
and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549-52 (1939). Tibor Scitovsky pro-
posed a stricter compensation requirement in Scitovsky, 4 Note on Welfare Propositions in
Economics, 9 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 77-88 (1941-1942).
163. See BRAFF, Supra note 161, at 271-72.
164. See Hochman & Rodgers, Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 542-57 (1969);
Goldfarb, Pareto Optimal Redistribution: Comment, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 994-96 (1970).
Hochman, Rodgers and Goldfarb explain that if "interdependent utility" exists, the Pareto
criteria requires redistribution. Interdependent utility exists if certain members of society
receive utility from the enhanced economic well-being of other members of society. Gold-
farb justified the progressive income tax on this basis. For a mathematical treatment of the
interdependent utility function see HENDERSON & QUANDT, supra note 161, at 297-98. See
also Markovits, 4 Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy 4nalysis in our Worse-Than-Sec-
ond-Best World- A Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to the Study of
Law and Economics, Wis. L. REV. 950, 977-88, 1069-70 (1955); Markovits, The Causes and
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by Pareto optimality does not mean social welfare is maximized since
that determination can only be made through normative judgments.
The economic concept of "externalities" is acutely relevant for the
analysis of plant closing legislation. Divergence between private and
social costs of an economic transaction creates externalities. I65 When
externalities exist, economic efficiency cannot be attained. 66  There-
fore, a policy requiring economic decisionmakers to internalize the
costs of externalities they are imposing upon others moves toward
greater, not less, efficiency.
Plant Closings and Externalities
A review of the effects of plant closings indicates that closings do, in
fact, produce many externalities. Since these externalities are borne by
workers and their communities and not the corporate decisionmakers
producing the externalities, the divergence between the private and so-
cial costs is economically inefficient. ' 67 This analysis focuses primarily
on the cost imposed on communities, rather than workers. These costs
are both pecuniary and nonpecuniary in nature.
Pecuniary Costs of Plant Closings
External pecuniary costs imposed upon communities and local gov-
ernments by plant closings include lost tax revenue, increased budget
Policy Significance o/Pareto Resource Misallocation.- A Checklistfor Micro-Economic Policy
Anaysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1975). Markovits argues:
The inequality of the distribution of income associated with the pattern in which final
goods (income) are distributed may also indirectly affect the extent of Pareto resource
misallocation by influencing the extent to which current adults (as well as children)
engage in allocatively undesirable criminal behavior or make misallocative purchas-
ing decisions, such as purchasing polluting, breakdown-prone cars or renting disease
and fire-spreading housing.
Id. at 8. In other words, economic policies which might otherwise appear to be Pareto effi-
cient (based on ordinal utility comparisons), yet allocate fewer resources to lower-income
persons, might not be efficient when the externalities created by that reallocation are consid-
ered. Markovits posits that the economic efficiency of a policy cannot be properly evaluated
without considering the policy's redistributive effects. Markovits proposes to weight dollar
gains and losses according to the income levels of the persons receiving the gains and losses.
These arguments lend support to plant closing legislation, since the legislation would, to
some degree, transfer wealth from the owners of capital to the workers.
165. For a more detailed and technical explanation of externalities, see TRESCH, supra note 161,
at 90-177; HENDERSON & QUANDT, supra note 161, at 302-04; MANSFIELD, supra note 161, at
372-74.
166. But for a view that government intervention is not required to achieve efficiency even in the
face of externalities, see Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. I (1960). Coase
argues these externalities can be internalized through bargaining between the affected par-
ties. Bargaining will produce economic efficiency if two criteria are met: 1) these negotia-
tions can be done at little or no cost, and 2) the property rights of the parties must be well-
defined. While perhaps theoretically accurate, the Coase Theorem is of limited relevance
since very few situations satisfy both criteria. In the case of plant closings, for example,
many parties are involved thus driving up the negotiation costs, while the property rights of
the workers at stake in plant relocations are highly disputed rather than well-defined.
167. See Adams, The flight ofJobs and Capital- Prospectsfor Grassroots Action in COMMUNITY
AND CAPITAL IN CONFLICT 18-19 (J. Raines, L. Berson & D. Gracie eds. 1982); Sclar, supra
note 7, at 235.
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outlays, and decreased business activity. The loss in a local govern-
ment's tax revenue occurs simultaneously with an increased demand
for the local government's services, especially its social services. 6 ' The
loss of employment and business activity caused by a plant closing cre-
ates "secondary shocks" to the local economy, multiplying the loss be-
yond the initial cost of the plant closing itself.' 69 Such a downward
spiral discourages long term capital investment in a community.170
Furthermore, local governments often sell long-term bonds to fi-
nance their physical infrastructure-roads, sewers, schools, and parks,
for example. These plans are made in reliance on long-term invest-
ment in the community. When corporations make short-term use of
the community's infrastructure in accordance with their own profit-
maximization plans, but leave before the debt on the bonds is paid, the
rest of the community must absorb the cost.
Non-Pecuniary Costs of Plant Closings
While the pecuniary costs imposed on communities are extensive,
nonpecuniary costs are even more severe. These costs include disrup-
tion of the local labor market, increases in the number of health
problems, and a breakdown of the cohesiveness of the community.
Plant closings disrupt the local labor markets because they dispro-
portionately affect women, minorities, and older workers. Minorities
are disproportionately affected because they are more heavily concen-
trated in northern states as blue collar workers. ' 7' Plant closings dispro-
portionately affect women since women typically have less mobility. 72
Yet the adverse effect on older workers is even greater. 7 3 Many plant
closings occur in long-declining industries and, as a result, the workers
laid off by plant closings tend to be older,' 74 which makes their reem-
ployment more difficult.' 75 This result could be attributed both to age
168. See GoRDIEs, supra note 44, at 50; BLUESTONE, supra note 1, at 67, 72-78. But see Hekman
& Strong, supra note 12, at 36. Hekman and Strong argue that the loss in revenue and
increased costs for services facing communities "is not an external cost in a true sense" but
rather "is a loss only from the local point of view, not from the national point of view."
However, this is analogous to arguing that lakes destroyed by acid rain do not constitute an
externality since polluting factories employ workers in some other region. Furthermore,
even if the revenue shortfall was not itself an externality, the disruption caused to local gov-
ernment in their fiscal planning by "regional rotation" certainly is. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 195-206.
169. BLUESTONE, supra note I, at 67.
170. See, e.g., Plant Closings and Relocations- Hearings Before the Senate Comm on Labor and
Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979) (statement of Kenneth Gibson, Mayor of
Newark, N.J.).
171. See Squires, Runaway Factories are Also a Civil Rights Issue, IN THESE TIMES, May 14-20,
1980), at 10; Adams, supra note 167, at 20. At least one lawsuit has been filed alleging a
violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by a plant closing disproportionately
affecting minority employees. Id.
172. Adams, supra note 167, at 20-21.
173. See Gop-Dis, supra note 44, at 67-95.
174. Id. at 68.
175. Id. at 74, 81-82.
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discrimination'76 and to the strong personal attachments older workers
have toward their community.177 Their attachment decreases their mo-
bility.IT7 By adversely affecting women, minorities, and older workers,
plant closings contravene the public policy of providing affirmative ac-
tion for these groups. 179
Increased unemployment caused by plant closings can have a se-
vere impact on the physical and mental health of community mem-
bers.'8 ° Higher unemployment leads to increased suicide, mental
illness, cirrhosis of the liver, cardiovascular disease, and overall mortal-
ity. ' Plant closings have also been found to increase the number of
cases of ulcers, arthritis, hypertension, and alcoholism.8 2
Physical and mental health problems are only a part of the social
cost attributable to plant closings. Higher unemployment has been
found to lead to increased criminal aggression as measured by homi-
cide and imprisonment rates.8 3
The increase in illness, suicide, and crime is only symptomatic of
the larger problem: the breakdown of the community. Business reloca-
tions destroy the sense of community in two ways. First, mobility of
capital necessitates mobility of labor. A highly mobile labor force pro-
duces alienation in society.' 84 Second, the community in which the
plant is closed often loses its own cohesion, depending on the magni-
tude of the plant closing. One case study on a plant closing concluded
that residents of the community
lost more than their economic core; they lost the central focus which
had long held the community together-its reason for existence-a fo-
cus which was held almost as community property, one which pro-
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. For an illustration of this public policy see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1608.1-. 12 (1983). These regulations
state that employers "should take voluntary action to correct the effects of past discrimina-
tion .. ." Id. § 1608.1(c).
180. See JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., ESTIMATING
THE SOCIAL COST OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY, IMPLICATIONS FOR MENTAL AND PHYS-
ICAL HEALTH AND CRIMINAL AGGRESSION (Comm. Print 1976) (by Harvey Brenner, Associ-
ate Professor of Johns Hopkins University) [hereinafter cited as the SOCIAL COST OF
NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY]; NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, TERMINATION: THE CONSE-
QUENCES OF JOB Loss, (1977) (S. Cobb & S. Kasl); January 1980 Hearings, supra note 12, at
274-75 (statement of Joe Willis, member of the U.A.W.).
181. See SOCIAL COST OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 180, at 65-74; Table 2 at VII
in the "Letter of Transmittal" from Sen. Humphrey, D-Minn.
182. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 180.
183. See SOCIAL COST OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 180, at 70-73.
184. See D. YANKELOVICH, NEW RULES, (1980). Yankelovich notes his "Search for Community"
index, which measures the number of persons feeling "an intense need to compensate for the
impersonal and threatening aspects of modern life by seeking mutual identification with
others," increased from 32% in 1973 to 47% in 1980-a period of rapid increase in the rate of
labor mobility. Id. at 251. See also E. DURKHEIM, SUICIDE (1897) (J. Spaulding & G. Simp-
son trans. 195 1). Durkheim demonstrates how mobility causes alienation through the break-
down of the family and community, and in turn, increases suicides. See also Catalano &
Dooley, The Behavioral Costs of Economic Instability, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR DISTRESSED
COMMUNITIES (F. Redburn & R. Buss eds. 1982).
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vided not only for economic needs but also meaning, incentive and a
sense of natural order and continuity to their existence, a structural
framework which gave coherence and cohesion to their lives.' 
8 5
Another cost imposed on both workers and their communities is the
disruption of their labor market. Plant relocations work against the
public policy of providing workers an equitable share of the earnings of
production. 186 Congressional proponents of H.R. 2847 have expressed
concern over the increasingly widespread corporate policy of fleeing to
non-unionized regions."" Unemployment caused by plant closings
often remains longer than unemployment caused by other economic
decisions.'88 Faced with a prospective closing, workers and their unions
are often forced to make severe concessions. According to economist
Barry Bluestone, "capital mobility (or merely the threat of disinvest-
ment) has become the most powerful mechanism available to employ-
ers for extracting concessions from organized workers .. . 189
Plant relocations do not simply affect the labor market prospects of
the unemployed, but also weaken the labor market for all workers in
the community. Economists Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison
note that
The swelling of the ranks of the unemployed creates a reserve of malle-
able workers and even potential strikebreakers. The memory of such
drastic dislocation can have what labor experts call a 'chilling effect' on
future labor-management negotiations. 9
Besides upsetting the bargaining equilibrium between corporations
and unions, plant relocations produce weakened state and local health,
safety, and environmental regulations and a diminution of available
social services. Those jurisdictions with the weakest regulations and
the fewest social services often find themselves rated as the areas with
the best "business climate."'' Corporations, in turn, use these ratings
to pressure progressive state and local governments to cut back on reg-
ulations and social services.' 92 Consequently, plant relocations militate
against decentralized governmental functions because the need for fed-
eral regulation of health, safety, labor, the environment, and social
services becomes more acute.
185. August 1978 Hearings, supra note 12, at 138 (statement of Professor Walter Strange).
186. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, supra note 23, which attempts to provide workers a
voice in determining their wages through the collective bargaining process.
187. See, e.g., October 1974 Hearings, supra note 12, at 18 (statement of Rep. Conyers, D.-Mich.)
Rep. Conyer's stated: "I think we need to nationalize the employment situation so that we
don't have that situation where people are going south or going where there is no unionized
labor force to beat the cost and increase the profits.").
188. See BLUESTONE, supra note 1, at 51-52. Workers also often lose their pensions. Id. at 58.
189. Bluestone, Deindustrialization and the Abandonment of Community, in COMMUNITY AND
CAPITAL IN CONFLICT 54 (J. Raines, L. Berson & D. Gracie eds. 1982).
190. BLUESTONE, supra note 1, at 79-80.
191. GOODMAN, supra note 3, at 21.
192. See BLUESTONE, Supra note 1, at 18.
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Plant Closings and Economic Efficiency
Plant closings create externalities resulting in economic inefficiency.
Therefore, a policy to internalize the social cost of plant closings is eco-
nomically efficient. Yet even if plant closings did not create these ex-
ternalities, plant relocations would be inefficient for other reasons.
As previously mentioned, the neoclassical paradigm requires that
the "best available technology" must be implemented to attain effi-
ciency. In other words, resource inputs must be fully used to maximize
production.'9 3 Since the neoclassical paradigm treats human beings as
just another resource input, their long-term unemployment is inefficient
because they could be employed to produce more goods and services.
Therefore, the present American corporate practice of relocating plants
to lower labor costs, while leaving behind decimated communities and
unemployed workers, is economically inefficient. This hypercapital
mobility reduces the stability of the labor market and increases aggre-
gate unemployment. 94
Urban planner Robert Goodman refers to unimpeded capital mo-
bility as the game of "regional rotation":
Regional rotation is not a cheap system. As more regions are created,
more welfare costs are necessary to maintain them. The more the cities
and regions compete with each other, the more they duplicate each
other's infrastructure facilities. As winner cities and regions build new
roads, schools, and sewers, the losers must still maintain the debt and
upkeep costs of the ones they already have. Maintaining underused
facilities and services in the loser cities and regions, while creating sim-
ilar ones in the winners, adds to the financial burden of the entire
nation. 195
Besides allowing much of the nation's resources to go unused, the sys-
tem of regional rotation wastes state and local government resources
that are used to lure corporations to move their plants around the coun-
try.196 Goodman notes that there "are more than 15,000 promotional
agencies whose major function is to entice jobs from each other's state
and local government.""'' This economic warfare is leading to the ero-
sion of state and local governments' tax bases and a diminution of so-
cial services. 9 s
Regional rotation might have some redeeming value if it could de-
monstrably improve the situation of those regions on the receiving end
of the plant relocations. Unfortunately, the evidence indicates these
benefits are mixed. First, the rapid economic growth rate associated
with receiving new plants does not result in a lower rate of unemploy-
193. See supra notes 160-164 and accompanying text.
194. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
195. GOODMAN, supra note 3, at 84.
196. Id. at xiv.
197. Id.
198. See August 1978 Hearings, supra note 12, at 53 (statement of Marc Stepp, Vice-President,
U.A.W.).
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ment, since rapid growth can create labor market instability.'99 Sec-
ond, this rapid growth places great stress on the local governments to
expand the community's physical infrastructure, and yet meet the in-
creased demand for other services. 2" Furthermore, this increased de-
mand for government money occurs at the same time the government
may have given the corporation a significant tax break to enable it to
keep up in the competitive game of "regional rotation." '' The illusory
gains from attracting new industry may have a short-term payoff for
certain politicians, but it threatens the fiscal health of state and local
202 tgovernments. Third, the social costs to communities receiving indus-
try too quickly mirror the problems of communities losing industry.
Bluestone and Harrison note that "both the physical and emotional
health consequences of boomtown developments turn out to be similar
to those found in communities like Youngstown and Akron that experi-
ence acute capital loss. ' ' 203 Bluestone and Harrison urge debate on the
appropriate rate of what they call "capital velocity. ' ' 2°  They argue
that the rate at which new investment can be absorbed at an optimal
social cost is lower than the present growth rate of many communi-
ties. 20 5 Bluestone and Harrison also note that the reindustrialization of
the north carries with it social costs, including greater inequality in the
distribution of income.20 6
In short, widespread plant relocations waste both human and finan-
cial resources. The prevalence of long-term unemployment in many
communities indicates plant closings and relocations have contributed
to inefficiency in the American economy. Therefore, even examined
from the perspective of the neoclassical paradigm, unimpeded capital
mobility has been inefficient, and H.R. 2847, which would slow the rate
199. See Motlack, The City as a Growth Machine." Toward a Political Economy of Place, 82 AM. J.
OF Soc. 309, 321 (1976). According to Motlack,
the systematic evidence fails to show any advantage to growth: there is no tendency
for either larger places or more rapidly growing ones to have lower unemployment
rates than other kinds of urban areas. In fact, the tendency is for rapid growth to be
associated with higher rates of unemployment.
Id. at 321. See also August 1978 Hearings, supra note 12, at 53 (statement of Marc Stepp,
Vice-President, U.A.W.). Mr. Stepp observed:
Nor has the federal government considered how to stop the ongoing and mutually
ruinous competition between states and municipalities for business and jobs. These
tax giveaways and other subsidies and enticements constitute a form of industrial
piracy, which erode the local tax base everywhere while enriching corporate coffers,
without contributing at all to the net number of jobs nationwide.
The effect of this economic warfare has been increased profits to corporations
through increased tax avoidance, lower wages and minimal regulation. For the units
of government, it has meant depletion of treasuries and curtailment of services; for the
country as a whole, it has represented no gain in employment.
200. See BLUESTONE, supra note 1, at 91.
201. Id.
202. See GOODMAN, supra note 3, at 84.
203. BLUESTONE, supra note I, at 91.
204. Id. at 105.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 92-98.
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of capital mobility and internalize its social costs, would promote eco-
nomic efficiency.
NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF HOUSE BILL 2847
Economic analysis does not itself measure what is in society's best
interest or what is ethical; it merely examines how to allocate goods so
as to maximize utility. Economic efficiency can only be a measure of
justice if utility is a measure of justice. In view of the competing value
systems, a public policy encouraging plant closings might not be desira-
ble even if Professor McKenzie is correct in his allegation that they
enhance economic efficiency.
McKenzie does not oppose H.R. 2847 solely on the Pareto criteria;
rather, he asserts that freedom is an overriding value justifying his posi-
tion. He argues that the free market best upholds this value:
Individuals know, within tolerable limits, what is best for them in their
individual circumstances and they are the ones best qualified to say
what they should do and where they should live-how and where they
should invest their resources, labor and financial capital. The right of
entrepreneurs to use their capital assets is part and parcel of a truly free
society; the centralization of authority to determine where and under
what circumstances firms should invest leads to the concentration of
economic power in the hands of people who run the government. Pri-
vate rights to move, to invest, to buy, to sell are social devices for the
dispersion of economic power.20 7
Merely asserting freedom as a value does not itself justify exercising
control over capital so as to cause widespread unemployment. It must
be demonstrated that the corporations have the right to use capital
solely for their own goals. Opponents of government economic regula-
tion have often based their opposition explicitly or implicitly on a
Lockean concept of property rights. John Locke's justification of indi-
vidual property rights rests on his "labor theory" of value: the person
mixing his labor with a good acquires a property right to the good. 20 8
According to Locke, by mixing labor with the good a person excludes
the "common right" of other persons to use that property. 20 9 In this
highly specialized and technological world in which money serves as a
store of value, this Lockean view of property acquisition has lost some
of its efficacy. Instead, modern economic libertarians base their posi-
tion on the premise that the state has only limited authority to interfere
with the private use of property. 210
207. McKenzie, supra note I1, at 126.
208. See J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT 32 (1690) (C. Sherman ed. 1937).
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Robert Nozick who posits the "minimal state" as the only just one. R. NOZICK,
ANARCY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). See also M. FREIDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM
(1962). Frederick Hayek formerly posited his support of the neoclassical paradigm on the
value of "freedom." See F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). More recently Hayek's
position appears to be based on Positivism: "the term social justice is wholly devoid of
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While "freedom" is important in Western civilization, the concept
of absolute property rights is contrary to the Judeo-Christian ethical
tradition.2 ' The most recent papal encyclical on the subject,21 2 asserts
that capital is to be a servant of the worker and not vice-versa, 213 and
that the philosophical approach favored by proponents of the neoclas-
sical paradigm and laissez-faire ideology, "economism," is morally
unacceptable.21 4
The ethical position assumed by proponents of plant closing legisla-
tion is hardly unique. These ethical principles have widespread recog-
nition in American public policy. Labor, health, and safety laws are
usually based on the assumption that workers are more valued than
capital.215
An analysis of H.R. 2847 cannot be complete without considering
the value conflicts involved in the debate over restrictions on capital
mobility. A complete analysis cannot be provided by weighing
whether such restrictions are "efficient" or "inefficient." The public
policy debate on this issue should refocus its attention on the underly-
ing normative issues.
CONCLUSION
House bill 2847 is a necessary response to the growing problem of
plant closings. State legislation and collective bargaining have proven
ineffective in curtailing such closings. The corporate decision to close
or relocate a plant imposes high social and economic costs upon both
workers and community. Congress should act to prevent these costs
from being imposed by approving House bill 2847.
House bill 2847 is consistent with the public policy of protecting
meaning or content .. " 2 F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 96 (1976). Rich-
ard Posner would maintain that the outcome of the free market distribution of goods is just,
since in his scheme wealth maximization is itself a principle of "justice." See R. POSNER,
THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). On the other hand, John Rawls, while not a libertarian,
would support the neoclassical paradigm to arrive at an original allocation of goods, but
would then redistribute goods from the market outcome as to benefit the least well-off. De-
spite his support of redistribution, Rawls favors the free market scheme as a method of pro-
moting "efficiency" and free choice of occupation. See J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
258-84 (1971).
211. For a summation of the Roman Catholic position on government intervention in the econ-
omy, see R. McBRIEN, CATHOLICISM 1043-49, 1054-55 (1981). For a Protestant view of the
government's role, see S. MOTT, BIBLICAL ETHICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1982).
212. POPE JOHN PAUL II, LABOREM EXERCENS (1981).
213. See id. See also G. BAUM, THE PRIORITY OF LABOR (1982).
214. POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 212. See also CANADIAN CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISH-
OPS, ETHICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE ECONOMIC CRISIS (1983) in which the Social Affairs
Commission of the Canadian Catholic Bishops criticize plant closings and the corporate pol-
icy of "profit maximization."
215. See, e.g., American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981), in
which the Court upheld the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's decision not to
conduct a "cost-benefit" analysis before implementing safety standards. Cost-benefit analy-
sis is a common tool of the neoclassical model. The Court held that in enacting the standard
of "to the extent feasible" in 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976) instead of cost-benefit analysis,
Congress "chose to place pre-eminent value on assuring employees a safe and healthful
working environment ... " 452 U.S. at 540.
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workers against the costs of laissez-faire economic policy. The Na-
tional Employment Priorities Act would prove an incentive for corpo-
rate responsibility and remind management that the corporation is a
mere legal and economic invention of the society in which it seeks to
profit.
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